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1 Introduction
Most industrial countries are likely to face severe fiscal sustainability problems due to
substantial ageing of their populations over the next fifty years, given prolongation of the
present fiscal policy and welfare schemes.1 The fiscal sustainability problem is likely to
be particularly severe in the Scandinavian welfare states where the government provides
relatively generous and highly non-actuarial pensions and most of the health and care
services.2
Fiscal sustainability is often analysed by considering the conditions for stabilizing the
ratio between government debt and GDP, see e.g. Roux (1993), Hemming and Miranda
(1991), and Cronin and McCoy (2000). The latter paper claims that this debt ratio is the
conventional indicator of fiscal sustainability. Fiscal sustainability indicators denoted in
terms of ratios to GDP are often associated with the so called OECD-Method of assessing
fiscal sustainability, which draws on Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor (1990).
Bentz and Fetzer (2004) provide a discussion of this method and compares it with Gen-
erational Accounting. As made explicit in Goldfajn (2002), the rationale for considering
this ratio is a positive relationship between GDP and the primary budget surplus, which
can be motivated by the positive correlation between GDP and the tax bases. In such a
highly simplified framework, accelerated economic growth in the private sector improves
fiscal sustainability - by assumption.
In more sophisticated analyses, based on generational accounting or CGE models,
productivity growth in the private sector (not in the government service sectors e.g. as a
result of Baumol’s disease), has diﬀerent eﬀects on government revenues and expenditures,
making the budget eﬀect less obvious. However, most studies find that productivity growth
contributes, cet. par., to mitigate the problems of fiscal sustainability through expansion
of tax bases. For example Gokhale and Raﬀelhüschen (1999) suspects budget projections
1See Chauveau and Loufir (1995), OECD (1998, 2000, 2001), the European Commission (2001), Mc-
Morrow and Roeger (2002) and Visco (2002) for international comparisons of quantitative assessments of
the fiscal and macroeconomic consequences of ageing. Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters and Walliser (2001), Kotlikoﬀ
(2001) and Feldstein (2005) estimate the fiscal gap in the US. Kotlikoﬀ and Burns (2004) provide a popular
exposition of the long-term fiscal challenges facing the US. Beetsma, Bettendorf and Broer (2003) and
The Danish Welfare Commission (2004) estimate the need for raising the tax burden in the Netherlands
and Denmark, respectively. Andersen, Jensen and Pedersen (2004) provide a review in English of the fiscal
sustainability assessment made in the Danish Welfare Commission (2004).
2This also includes Norway, although the high state petroleum revenues makes Norway a fiscal outlier
measured by the current government wealth accumulation. However, Norway faces a sharp increase in
government expenditures when ageing sets in after 2010, and the current fiscal policy is not sustainable,
see Heide, Holmøy, Solli and Strøm (2006).
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for the U.S. to be too optimistic because they find the projected productivity growth to be
higher than warranted by U.S. experience. Using a large CGE model, Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters,
and Walliser (2001) find that a productivity-driven decline (increase) in the real wage
growth contributes to the increase (decrease) in the future tax rates necessary to meet the
intertemporal government budget constraint. With reference to these simulation studies,
Kotlikoﬀ (2001, pp. 37) concludes: "A higher rate of technological progress improves, but
doesn’t fundamentally alter, the demographic transition." Heald (2005) reviews long run
projections for the UK presented in Treasury (2004), which show that higher productivity
reduces the future need for fiscal tightening. Cronin and McCoy (2000) find the same
pattern in alternative long run projections of the Irish economy.
These results may leave the impression that a positive correlation between productivity
growth in the private sector and the fiscal stance is a robust "law". Policy makers may
even consider future fiscal sustainability problems to be overrated to the extent that they
regard productivity growth projections to be negatively biased.
However, also government expenditures are likely to be positively related to the pro-
ductivity level in private sectors. To the extent that productivity growth increases the
general wage rate, the government wage bill increases. The more so, the less is the inter-
sectoral wage dispersion in the economy. Moreover, wage indexation of government cash
transfers implies that the additional income caused by productivity improvements are
spread automatically to all citizens, not only to the more productive workers.3 In result,
the fiscal eﬀect of economic growth is ambiguous as discussed in Andersen and Pedersen
(2006a, 2006b) and Heide, Holmøy, Solli and Strøm (2006). For respectively Denmark and
Norway, these studies find that improved productivity in the private sector has an adverse
fiscal eﬀect in the sense that at least one tax rate must be increased to restore fiscal sus-
tainability. Galasso (1999) derives the same conclusion for the social security tax rate, but
his model takes into account that the equilibrium solution for this tax rate also reflects a
majoritarian voting game.
The purpose of this paper is to examine more thoroughly how and why diﬀerent pro-
ductivity shifts aﬀect a tax rate (levied on labour income) that adjusts endogenously to
meet the government budget constraint. More precisely, I try to answer the questions: 1)
Does productivity growth in the private sector mitigate or reinforce fiscal sustainability
problems? 2) To what extent do the fiscal eﬀects of productivity growth depend on which
sectors that experience higher productivity? 3) What are the basic determinants of the
fiscal eﬀects of productivity growth? 4) How strong are these eﬀects? A precise analysis of
3Raﬀelhüschen (2002) points out how the results of generational accounting depend crucially on wether
government welfare payments are indexed to wages or consumer prices.
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these questions is lacking in the studies referred to above.
As indicated above the answer to the first question will depend on the wage depen-
dency of the diﬀerent budget components. As to the second question my hypothesis is that
productivity growth in sectors producing traded goods (T-sectors) will have a stronger fis-
cal eﬀect than comparable productivity growth in sectors producing non-traded goods
(N-sectors). The motivation for this hypothesis is the textbook model of the small open
economy (SOE). In the SOE-model the equilibrium wage rate is determined by the world
prices of outputs and the productivity in the T-sectors, cf. the factor price equalization
theorem. On the other hand, productivity growth in N-sectors will be shifted forwards to
lower product prices. This aﬀects the budget surplus through a decline in the base of indi-
rect taxes, as well as the outlays of government spending on a given volume of non-traded
goods. However, my conjecture is that these eﬀects will be smaller than the eﬀects induced
by a higher wage rate. An explanation of the basic determinants of the fiscal eﬀects of
productivity growth, called for in the third question above, warrants a comparative statics
analysis of a stylized model. On the other hand, the strength of the various eﬀects (ques-
tion four) can only be estimated by simulations on an empirical model. Since this paper
is confined to long run eﬀects, a CGE model is the appropriate tool. Designed properly,
the CGE model should capture country specific characteristics that is a priori likely to
aﬀect the necessary adjustment of the tax rate to productivity shifts. Specifically, such
relevant characteristics include the wage dependency of the various government revenue
and expenditure components.
In line with these considerations this paper relies on both a formal model analysis, as
well as relevant simulation experiments on a large scale CGE model of a particular econ-
omy, Norway. It should be stressed that the analytical model is not arbitrarily specified.
Rather, it represents an almost embarrassing simple model of the much more complex
CGE model. It is designed with the particular purpose to provide a stringent and trans-
parent explanation of the most important equilibrium eﬀects of those included in the CGE
model. In this respect the paper is intended to be an improvement compared to studies
relying on either simulations of highly complex and non-transparent CGE models that are
hard to understand and verify, or on analytical discussions of highly stylized models ruling
out potentially important mechanisms.
The analysis pays particular attention to the fiscal eﬀects of general equilibrium adjust-
ments of the wage rate, which represents the real exchange rate. In particular, it addresses
the price eﬀects of the wage adjustments. It also examines the more familiar wage eﬀect
on the tax bases through labour supply, but for the sake of expositional clarity, I have
chosen to incorporate the complexities generated by endogenous labour supply responses
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to a separate section. Both the attention paid to price eﬀects on the government budget
due to wage rate adjustments, as well as the particular CGE model used in this paper,
make this paper related to Holmøy (2006).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a theoretical model,
which is stripped down to the minimum ingredients necessary to explain the fiscal eﬀect of
productivity shifts in, respectively, the T- and the N-sectors. Section 3 extends the model to
include endogenous labour supply responses. Section 4 demonstrates the empirical strength
of diﬀerent fiscal eﬀects by presenting results of relevant simulation experiments on a
realistic general equilibrium model of the Norwegian economy. Section 5 summarizes the
conclusions.
2 A Stylized model
We consider a static model of a small open economy with two sectors producing, respec-
tively one traded (T) and one non-traded (N) good with labour as the only input. There are
constant return to scale in both sectors. A representative consumer supplies an exogenous
amount of labour and has homothetic preferences over the N-and the T-good. World prices
and the exchange rate are exogenous and normalised to unity. The government produces
some services by using labour, the quantity of which has no eﬀect on the demand func-
tions for imports and the N-good. It finances the wage costs by collecting taxing on labour
income and consumption. In addition, the government owns an exogenous endowment of a
tradable, possibly diﬀerent from the other goods. This endowment may be interpreted as
e.g. property rights of natural resources such as oil and/or predetermined financial claims
on the rest of the world. The wealth associated with this endowment may be negative, e.g.
if the government sector uses imports to produce services or is indebted to foreigners.
The model consists of the following 8 equations:
XT = ATLT (1)
CN = ANLN (2)
W = AT (3)
PN =
W
AN
(4)
tC (CT + PNCN) + tLWL+O =WLG (5)
(1 + tC) (CT + PNCN) = (1− tL)WL (6)
CT
CN
= PσN (7)
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LT + LN + LG = L (8)
XT is output of the traded good. CN denotes output and consumption of the non-
traded good, and CT is consumption of the T-good. The utility function is a homothetic
CES utility function with σ as the elasticity of substitution between the T- and the N-
good. Units are chosen so that the preferences over the two goods are symmetric. L is total
employment, LG, LT and LN is employment in, respectively, the government sector, the
T- and the N-sector. Ai is labour productivity in sector i = T,N . PN is the price of the
N-good. W is the wage rate paid by producers. O is the value of the exogenous amount of
another tradable owned by the government, denominated in terms of the T-good. tL and
tC are, respectively, the tax rates on labour income and consumption.
(1) and (2) are the production functions in the T- and N-sector, assuming equilibrium in
the market for the N-good. (3) and (4) follow from perfect competition in both sectors. (5)
is the government budget constraint, and (6) is the budget constraint of the representative
consumer. We shall let tL be the fiscal instrument that endogenously adjusts to meet this
constraint. (7) follows from the first order condition for utility maximization, reflecting that
the consumption tax rate is levied both on imports and the N-good. (8) is the labour market
equilibrium condition. O, L, LG, tC and PT = 1 are exogenous. The model determines
the 8 endogenous variables XT , LT , LN , PN , W , CN , CT and tL. We shall examine how
changes in AT and AN aﬀect tL.
Define the eﬀective aggregate tax rate τ ≡ tL+tC1+tC . The solution for τ is found directly
by inserting the private budget constraint into the government budget constraint, and
using W = AT :
tC (CT + PNCN) + tLWL+O = WLG ⇔
tC

1− tL
1 + tC

WL+ tLWL = WLG −O⇔
τ = 1
L

LG −
O
AT

(9)
Contingent on the assumptions underlying the model above, (9) proves the following
conclusions:
1. The productivity in the N-sector is irrelevant for tL and τ .
2. If O = 0, tL and τ also become independent of AT : τ |O=0 = LGL .
3. When O > 0, productivity growth in the T-sector makes it necessary to raise the
tax rate.
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The intuition behind conclusion (2) is that when O = tC = 0, both government revenue
and expenditure are proportional toW , and their initial values are equal. With exogenous
labour supply, government labour cost being the only expenditure, and uniform wage rates
in all sectors, W is the only endogenous variable aﬀecting tL. Consequently, any change
in W will be budget neutral.
The intuition behind conclusion (3) is that when O > 0, increased AT reduces OAT , i.e.
the real value of O in terms of the government wage bill. The tax base of tL increases by
the same proportion as the government wage bill when a higher AT raises W . But the
absolute increase in revenue is smaller since the initial expenditure exceeds the tax revenue
by O. Conversely, when O < 0 productivity growth in the T-sector allows for a tax rate
reduction.
As to conclusion (1) it follows from the independence between the wage rate and AN
that productivity growth in the N-sector aﬀects neither government expenditure nor the
labour income tax revenue. It is less obvious that the revenue from the consumption tax is
invariant to AN . The intuition behind this result is that although an increase in AN will
raise CN due to both an income eﬀect and a substitution eﬀect caused by the fall in the
relative price of PN , the reduction of PN also reduces the current value of the consumption
tax base. The two eﬀects cancel out. This is shown formally in the Appendix. Here it is
shown that the equilibrium consumption tax base equals
CT + PNCN = AT (L− LG) +O, (10)
which is independent of AN .
Although the model is very simple, flexible interpretation of the variables extends the
relevance of the conclusions. First, recall that O captures the initial government endow-
ment/income of a traded good, including revenue from sales of natural resources, use of
imports in the production of public services, and predetermined financial claims on or
debt to the rest of the world. Second, wage indexed transfers, e.g. public pension benefits,
from the government to the household can be interpreted as parts of WLG. To see this,
let N be the exogenous number of transfer recipients and b the individual benefit ex ante
wage indexation. Government expenditures now equalsW (LG + bN), which plays exactly
the same role as WLG in the model above. It is straightforward to show that the price
reduction caused by higher AN will contribute to reduce the tax rate if the tax financed
transfers to the consumer are indexed completely or partly (through e.g. P ) to PN .
It is also straightforward to introduce government purchases of goods in the model.
Let GT and GN denote government purchases of, respectively, the T- and the N-good.
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Combining the private and government budget constraints, the tax rate becomes
τ ≡ tL + tC
1 + tC
=
1
L

LG +
GN
AN
− O

AT

,
where O ≡ O − GT . Now productivity growth in the N-sector reduces the tax rate.
However, the reason is that the price of the N-good falls relative to government revenues.
As showed above, the expansionary volume eﬀect on the tax base is cancelled out by other
eﬀects. Still, productivity growth in the T-sector requires an increase in the tax rate when
O > 0.
3 Endogenous labour supply
We now introduce endogenous labour supply. We assume a nested CES utility function
U = U (C,F ), where F is leisure and C is the subutility C = C (CT , CN). As above C ()
is homothetic, whereas the income elasticities for C and F may deviate from unity.
In addition to equations (1) - (5) above, the model now includes the equations:
P = (1 + tC)P (1, PN) = (1 + tC)

1 + P 1−σCN
 1
1−σC (11)
CT = P
σCC (12)
CN =

PN
P
−σC
C (13)
LT +LN + LG = l (ω,ωT ) , (14)
C = ωl (ω,ωT ) , (15)
where ω = (1−tL)W(1+tC)P is the net of tax consumer real wage rate. P is the ideal consumer
price index of the composite of imports and the N-good. (12) and (13) are the compensated
demand functions contingent on C. l (ω,ωT ) is the uncompensated labour supply function
derived from
MaxL U (C,F ) s.t. C + ωF = ωT ⇒ L = T − F (1,ω,ωT ) = l (ω,ωT ) .
(15) summarizes the private budget constraint. Define lˆω as the uncompensated labour
supply elasticity wrt. ω. From the Slutsky equation lˆω = −FL eFω = −FLεFω− FT EF , where
eFω and εFω are, respectively, the uncompensated and compensated wage elasticities of
leisure, and EF is the income elasticity of leisure.
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Using τ ≡ tL+tC1+tC , ω can be written in terms of τ and productivity parameters:
ω = (1− tL)W
(1 + tC)P
=
(1− τ)AT
P

PT ,
AT
AN
 . (16)
Taking this into account, the tax rate consistent with general equilibrium is implicitly
determined by
τ l (ω,ωT ) = LG −
O
AT
. (17)
Let R (τ) = τ l

(1− τ) WP , (1− τ) WTP

denote the Laﬀer-curve associated with τ . The
Laﬀer-curve takesW and P as given. In relative terms, its slope is Rˆτ ≡ ∂R(τ)∂τ
τ
R = 1−
τ lˆω
1−τ .
Assuming the economy being at the increasing part of the Laﬀer-curve implies
Rˆτ > 0⇔ lˆω <
1− τ
τ =
1− tL
tL + tC
. (18)
Is it restrictive to assume Rˆτ > 0? To answer this, first note that the maximum value of
lˆω is negatively related to the tax rates, since 1−ττ is decreasing in τ (and tL and tC). Second,
note that tL should include all tax rates levied on labour income, including the payroll tax
rate and the tax element in mandatory non-actuarial public pension contributions. Third,
means-testing of several government cash transfers implies significant eﬀective taxation of
labour.4 Fourth, due to ageing future tax rates are likely to be significantly higher than
the present ones, and they are the most relevant when evaluating the likelihood of Rˆτ > 0
in the context of the present paper. Fifth, the low positive estimates on lˆω found in most
empirical studies of labour supply, relate to the labour supply decision at the internal
margin. Labour supply is found to be much more responsive to economic incentives at the
extensive margin, including retirement, see e.g. Heckman (1993) and Gruber and Wise
(2004).
Taking Norway as an example, realistic estimates of present tax rates would be tC =
0.2, tL = 0.5 (including only the personal income tax and the payroll tax), which implies
1−τ
τ = 0.7. According to the projections in Heide, Holmøy, Solli and Strøm (2006) tL would
have to increase to about 0.6 in 2050, which implies that 1−ττ = 0.5. Still, this critical value
is significantly higher than most estimates of lˆω, see Dagsvik and Jia (2006) and Aaberge,
Colombino, Holmøy, Strøm and Wennemo (2006). In the latter study the aggregate lˆω
varies between 0.12 and 0.14.
4See e.g. Mogstad, Solli and Wist (2006) for a survey of the eﬀective taxation implicit in Norwegian
welfare schemes.
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The necessary adjustment of τ to exogenous marginal changes in the productivity
parameters is found by diﬀerentiation of (17) wrt. τ , AT and AN :
dτL+ τ lˆωL
dω
ω = OdAT ⇔
dτ = 1
Rˆτ

O
L
− τ lˆωθT

dAT − τ lˆωθNdAN

.
where we have used that dωω = −
dτ
1−τ + θTdAT + θNdAN , where θi is the budget share
of good i = T,N . Aˆi = dAiAi = dAi when Ai = 1, i = T,N initially. The partial derivatives
become
∂τ
∂AT
=
O
L − τ lˆωθT
Rˆτ
=
O
L − τ lˆωθT
1− τ lˆω1−τ
, (19)
∂τ
∂AN
= −τ lˆωθN
Rˆτ
= − τ lˆωθN
1− τ lˆω1−τ
. (20)
(20) is the simplest one of these expressions. Compared to the quite realistic case of
inelastic labour supply discussed above, an endogenous labour supply response may force
τ in either direction. ∂tL∂AN > 0 for lˆω < 0∨ lˆω >
1−tL
tL+tC
. As
lˆω
→∞, ∂τ∂AN → θN (1− τ). On
the other hand, 0 < lˆω <
1−tL
tL+tC
⇔ ∂τ∂AN < 0. The intuition is that an increase inAN raises ω
through a drop in PN . When the income eﬀect on labour supply dominates the substitution
eﬀect, so that lˆω < 0, the tax base of the labour income tax declines. Also the base of
the consumption tax falls, since (10) implies CT +PNCN = AT (l (ω,ωT )− LG)+O. Cet.
par., raising tL increases the tax revenue directly, as well as indirectly through increased
tax bases.
When lˆω > 0, the increase in ω caused by the fall in PN raises L and the tax bases. As
long as the uncompensated labour supply function is not "too" wage elastic, i.e. as long
as 0 < lˆω <
1−tL
tL+tC
⇔ Rˆτ > 0, the government budget constraint is restored by reducing
tL.
The peak of the Laﬀer curve lˆω = 1−tLtL+tC represents a knife-edge on which the tax
revenue is invariant to marginal changes in the tax rates. When lˆω >
1−tL
tL+tC
, the tax rates
exceeds the peak of the Laﬀer-curve, and reducing the budget surplus back to zero requires
an increase in the tax rate. It is striking that a relatively small increase in lˆω from the range
of the typical estimates brings the economy from a situation where no tax rate adjustment
is required to counteract the budget eﬀect of changes in AN , to situations where even
unrealistically large tax rate adjustment is unable to restore government budget balance.
Moreover, a small changes in lˆω from one side of the knife-edge to the other call for widely
diﬀerent signs of the large tax rate adjustments.
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Figure 1. The necessary tax rate adjustment to marginal productivity improvements in the
N-sector (dt/dAN) as a function of the uncompensated labour supply elasticity (lw).
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Figure 1 summarizes this discussion of ∂tL∂AN . It graphs
∂tL
∂AN as a function of lˆω in the
particular case where tL = 0.6, tC = 0.2 (so that τ = 2/3) and θN = 0.5 initially, which
implies a vertical asymptote at lˆω = 0.5, and a horizontal asymptote at 0.17. Realistic tax
rates and most econometric estimates lˆω suggest that most economies would be positioned
on the part of the depicted locus where ∂tL∂AN < 0. The simulations reported in the next
section confirm that this is the case for Norway.
The labour supply response may also change the sign of ∂τ∂AT compared to the case
when lˆω = 0. (19) shows that ∂τ∂AT < 0 when the non-tax net revenue is not too large,
i.e. when 0 < OτLθT <
1−τ
τ ⇔ 0 <
O
CT
< 1 (since AT = W = PT = 1 initially), and
O
τLθT < lˆω <
1−tL
tL+tC
⇔ Rˆτ > 0. In this case the expansion of the tax bases caused by the
increase in ω, dominates the negative budget eﬀect of the increase in the wage rate. When
0 < lˆω < OτLθT , the labour supply growth mitigates the necessary increase in τ , whereas
the increase in τ is reinforced when lˆω < 0.
For completeness, we find the necessary tax rate adjustment to an equal marginal
productivity improvement, dA, from AT = AN = 1 in both sectors, by adding the partial
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derivatives:
∂τ
∂A =
∂τ
∂AT
+
∂τ
∂AN
=
O
L − τ lˆωθT − τ lˆωθN
1− τ lˆω1−τ
=
O
L − τ lˆω
1− τ lˆω1−τ
(21)
4 Empirical assessments
4.1 A CGE model of the Norwegian economy
This section provides estimates of the fiscal significance of productivity growth in private
industries based on a large scale CGE model of the Norwegian economy, MSG6. The
MSG6 simulations are complementary to the stylized model analysis above by including
a wide range of realistic eﬀects ignored in the stylized model. On the other hand, the
specific design of the stylized model is chosen in order to capture those mechanisms that
have proven to be empirically most significant for the problem studied in this paper. In
combination, the formal analysis and the MSG6 simulations are intended to provide both
realistic estimates of the main fiscal eﬀects of productivity shifts, as well as a precise
explanation and discussion of the nature of the empirically most important eﬀects.
My conjecture is that the relevance of an empirical model may be even greater for the
question analysed in this paper than for many other problems in the applied literature
on taxation. The analysis above supports this view by showing that the initial shares
of wage dependent revenues and expenditures in the government budget are crucial for
the magnitude of the fiscal eﬀect of the productivity shifts. Important sources to coun-
try diﬀerences here include wage or price indexation of public pension benefits, and the
government budget share of rents from natural resources.
I confine the description of MSG6 to the characteristics most important for our analysis.
A comprehensive description is given in Heide, Holmøy, Lerskau and Solli (2004).
The following characteristics of the stylized model are shared by MSG6: The nomi-
nal exchange rate and all world prices of exports and imports are exogenous; labour is
internationally immobile; all goods, services and production factors are perfectly mobile
between industries within the economy; supply equals demand in all markets in all periods;
a representative consumer adjusts consumption and labour supply to maximize utility, and
the uncompensated wage elasticity equal to 0.1; producers maximize the value of firms;
both producers and consumers consider imports of manufactures and services as close but
imperfect substitutes for the corresponding deliveries from Norwegian firms; the balanced
trade constraint is met by endogenous wage adjustment ensuring competitive profitability
in a suﬃciently large production of traded goods. The model is closed by letting endoge-
nous payroll tax rate adjustment balance the government budget.
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In order to serve as a realistic description of how the Norwegian economy works in the
long run, MSG6 is much more complex than the stylized model in several respects:
1. MSG6 provides a rather disaggregated description of the Norwegian economy, spec-
ifying 60 commodity groups.
2. MSG6 is dynamic; the consumer maximizes an intertemporal utility function, and
producers maximize the present value of the net-of-tax cash flow to the owners.
Agents have access to the international credit market, and the world interest rate is
exogenous to the Norwegian economy. Consumers and producers have perfect fore-
sight. The balanced trade constraint takes the form of a non-Ponzi game condition
on net foreign debt.
3. MSG6 takes into account that firms employ goods as intermediaries and capital
goods in addition to labour.
4. Producers of manufactures and tradable services allocate their output between the
domestic and the foreign market. It is costly to change the output composition
between these markets. Whereas domestic firms are price takers in all factor markets
and the export markets, they participate in Large Group Monopolistic Competition
with free entry/exit in the domestic markets.
5. The production functions in most private industries exhibit decreasing returns to
scale. The scale elasticities vary between 0.85 and unity. See Bye, Holmøy and Heide
(2006) for a discussion and a justification of the scale properties in MSG6.
6. In all scenarios below the fiscal policy rule adopted in 2001 is followed. Strictly,
this rule implies that the annual government petroleum revenue is transferred to the
Government Pension Fund - Global (GPFG), and that only an estimated real return
of 4 percent of the fund can be used to finance the non-petroleum budget deficit. In
order to meet the resulting time path of the government budget surplus, the payroll
tax rate adjusts annually. The payroll tax rate, rather than the tax rate on personal
labour income is chosen as the endogenous fiscal instrument, because it is a very
broad and flat tax on labour income, whereas the personal income tax system is
much more complex. The qualitative results from the formal analysis above are not
aﬀected by replacing the labour income tax rate by a payroll tax rate.
4.2 Simulation results
The scenarios associated with productivity shifts are compared to a baseline scenario based
on prolongation of the present fiscal and welfare policy, including present tax rates in real
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terms, the present public pension system and other welfare schemes, and wage indexation
of most cash transfers from the government to households. See Heide, Holmøy, Solli and
Strøm (2006) for more details.
The productivity shift scenarios are identical to the baseline scenario except for the
productivity assumptions. In the T-scenario the level of the total factor productivity
(TFP) index in three sectors producing mostly traded goods (Metals, Chemicals and Pulp
and Paper) are permanently increased by 10 percent. In the N-scenario the corresponding
TFP-shift is experienced by the Construction sector, producing mainly non-traded goods.
The particular choice of the three T-sectors is motivated by the fact that the total gross
production value in these sectors was about equal to that of the Construction sector in
2005. In a very simple model this would imply that the macroeconomic eﬀects of the two
TFP-shifts were similar.
The simulation results reported in Table 1 confirms that the two TFP-shifts have
about the same eﬀects on the macroeconomic aggregates, such as private consumption,
employment and the real wage rate. There are two basic reasons why the N-scenario is
somewhat more expansionary than the T-scenario. First, the rise in the consumer real
wage rate is stronger in the N-scenario, basically because the necessary increase in the
payroll tax rate is lower. Since government real spending, as well as the government budget
surplus, follow identical time paths in all scenarios, the positive substitution eﬀect on
labour supply is strongest in the T-scenario, whereas the negative income eﬀects are more
equal. Note that the income eﬀects on labour supply dominate the substitution eﬀects in
both productivity shifts. These income eﬀects include the eﬀects of both higher consumer
real wage, higher capital income and higher wage indexed cash transfers. Second, the N-
sector (Construction) grows relatively to the three T-sectors along the baseline scenario.
Consequently, the amount of resources experiencing increased productivity is greater in
the N-scenario than in the T-scenario.
Table 1 confirms the analytical results in Section 2: Both TFP-shifts require a higher
tax rate, and the T-scenario requires a higher tax rate than the N-scenario. Measured in
percentage points, the increase in the payroll tax caused by higher TFP in the N-sector is
only 1/3 of the corresponding increase in the T-scenario. Compared to the macroeconomic
eﬀects, the diﬀerences in fiscal eﬀects are strikingly large. Especially, the eﬀects on gross
revenues and gross expenditures are much greater in the T-scenario. The main reason
is the one explained in Section 2: The value of higher TFP in the T-sector implies is
shifted over to the price of the immobile resources, most notably labour. The increase in
the wage rate brings about a close to proportional increase in tax bases and government
expenditures. A crucial premise for this is wage indexation of most government transfers,
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including public pension entitlements. On the other hand, TFP-growth in the N-sector
leaves the unit labour cost and the wage rate nearly unaﬀected.
TFP-growth in both the T- and the N-sector has an adverse fiscal eﬀect because 1)
the wage rate increases in both experiments, and 2) wage dependent expenditures exceed
wage dependent revenues along the baseline, basically because of the significant petroleum
revenues collected by the Norwegian state. However, the latter inequality is more strongly
magnified in the shift that generates the greatest increase in the wage rate.
The stylized model in Section 3 neglects the mechanisms that make the unit labour cost
dependent on productivity in the N-sectors. In MSG6 two mechanisms produce this modest
dependency. First, higher productivity in the N-sectors reduces the prices of domestically
produced intermediaries and capital goods, which increases the competitive wage rate
consistent with trade balance. Second, higher productivity raises income and demand,
including demand for T-goods. With decreasing returns to scale, the increase in the T-
good necessary to restore balanced trade requires a decline in the labour cost. The former
eﬀect dominates in the MSG6 simulation reported in Table 1.
Table 1. Long run macroeconomic eﬀects in Norway of a 10 percent increase
in TFP in T-sectors and N-sectors. Percentage deviations from the baseline
scenario unless otherwise stated.
T-scenario N-scenario
Pay roll tax, percentage points 1.5 0.5
Total revenues, of which 5.4 0.3
Indirect taxes 3.4 -0.2
Direct taxes, net of petroleum revenues 7.2 0.5
Total expenditures, of which 5.9 0.3
Government consumption 6.2 0.8
Cash transfers to households 5.2 0.3
Private consumption 1.5 1.7
Employment -0.7 -0.4
Wage cost per hour 6.5 0.8
Wage rate 5.4 0.4
Consumer real wage rate 1.6 2.0
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5 Conclusions
This paper has tried to answer the questions: Does productivity growth in the private
sector mitigate or reinforce fiscal sustainability problems? To what extent do the fiscal ef-
fects of productivity growth depend on which sectors that experience higher productivity?
What are the determinants of the fiscal eﬀects of productivity growth? How strong are
these eﬀects?
The answers are based on both a formal model analysis, as well as relevant simulation
experiments on a CGE model of the Norwegian economy. It should be stressed that the
model analysed formally is not arbitrarily specified. Rather, it represents a model of the
much more complex CGE model, designed with the particular purpose to explain as trans-
parent as possible the nature of the most important general equilibrium eﬀects of those
included in the CGE model. In this respect the paper is intended to be an improvement
compared to studies relying on either simulations of highly complex and non-transparent
CGE models that are hard to understand and verify, or on analytical discussions of highly
stylized models ruling out potentially important mechanisms.
The analysis has paid particular attention to the fiscal eﬀects of general equilibrium
adjustments of the wage rate, which represents the real exchange rate. In particular, it has
addressed the price eﬀects of the wage adjustments. It also examines the more familiar
wage eﬀect on the tax bases through labour supply. The analysis justifies the following
conclusions:
1. Given fixed employment, constant returns to scale and proportionality between the
wage rate and all government budget components, the tax rate necessary to meet
the government budget constraint is independent of the productivity in all private
sectors.
2. If the government in addition receives a positive (negative) net revenue that is inde-
pendent of the wage rate, productivity growth in the traded goods sector warrants
an increase (decrease) in the tax rate. Still, productivity shifts in the sectors pro-
ducing non-traded goods have a neutral budget eﬀect, so they are irrelevant for the
endogenous tax rate.
3. Compared to the quite realistic case of inelastic labour supply, an endogenous labour
supply response may force the budget neutral tax rate in either direction. Increased
productivity in either sector raises the consumer wage rate. When the uncompen-
sated labour supply elasticity (lˆω) is negative, the labour supply response contributes
to reduce the tax bases. In this case, the budget neutral tax rate must increase when
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the productivity grows in the non-traded goods sector. The opposite is true when
wage elasticity of labour supply is positive but less than what corresponds to the
peak of the Laﬀer-curve. Higher productivity in the traded goods sector may now
allow tax rate reduction when the wage independent net non-tax revenue is positive.
This requires that the expansionary eﬀect on the tax bases dominates the negative
budget eﬀect of a higher wage rate.
4. The Laﬀer-curve peaks at lˆω = 1−tLtL+tC . This implies that the higher are the tax rates,
the smaller must the positive labour supply elasticity be for the economy to be on
the rising part of the Laﬀer-curve. For economies with relatively high tax rates,
such as the Scandinavian welfare states, the peak of the Laﬀer-curve is reached for
an uncompensated wage elasticity that is too close to the typical estimates to be
disregarded as a theoretical curiosity.
5. The simulations on a CGE model of the Norwegian economy demonstrate that the
price eﬀect of endogenous wage adjustment is significantly more important than the
labour supply eﬀect. The uncompensated labour supply elasticity is here set to 0.1,
in accordance with econometric studies of labour supply in Norway. However, this
may change in the future as the increase in the old-age dependency ratio requires
higher tax rates, cf. point 4.
6. Higher TFP in all private industries has an adverse fiscal eﬀect in our simulations.
When TFP is raised by 10 percent in traded goods sectors accounting for 6.6 percent
of total gross production value (in 2005), the payroll tax rate must be raised from 31
to 32.5 percentage points in 2050. If the same TFP shift takes place in a non-traded
goods sector of the same size, the corresponding increase in the payroll tax rate is
only 1/3, i.e. 0.5 percentage points.
The strength of the fiscal eﬀect of wage rate adjustments is likely to diﬀer significantly
between countries and over time, because it depends on both the magnitude of the change
in the wage rate, as well as the initial wage dependency of the various budget components.
Norway represents a very special case, foremost because of large government petroleum
revenues. Moreover, the wage dispersion is relatively low and constant, the government
employed as much as 27 percent of total man-hours in 2005, and government welfare
transfers, including public pension entitlements, are generous and indexed to wages. The
fiscal policy adopted since 2001 allows a substantial deficit of wage dependent government
net revenues. In countries where both the government and the economy as a whole must
serve substantial debt, wage dependent government net revenues may be positive. In such
countries productivity growth will, cet. par reduce the necessary tax rates.
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Higher productivity in the form discussed in this paper is manna from heaven. By
definition, it allows improved average welfare in the countries experiencing it. The possible
adverse fiscal eﬀect of productivity growth does not change this. None of the conclusions
in this paper are normative. But although productivity growth makes life easier for the
average person, it is an important policy lesson that politicians cannot rely on growth to
solve fiscal sustainability problems.
In most developed economies the service sector has absorbed an increasing share of
the factor supplies over several decades. Traditionally, services have been regarded as
less mobile internationally than manufactures and primary products. The conclusions in
this paper suggest that this trend has contributed to mitigate the adverse fiscal eﬀects
of productivity growth, compared to a hypothetical more balanced sectoral growth path.
However, globalization has increased international trade in services. Cet. par., this makes
the fiscal eﬀect of productivity shifts in the T-sector more relevant for the aggregate
picture.
It should be stressed that the conclusions above are confined to fiscal eﬀects of produc-
tivity shifts in the private business sector. Obviously, productivity growth in government
service production can improve the fiscal stance if it is used to reduce costs. However, as
explained in Holmøy (2006) the general equilibrium adjustment of the wage rate may re-
duce the scope for tax rate reductions significantly compared to a naive estimate ignoring
price eﬀects. In this paper the assumptions of no productivity growth in the government
sector has been made in order to highlight the more complex fiscal eﬀects of productivity
shifts in the private sectors. However, according to the hypothesis underlying the term
"Baumol’s Disease", the technological scope for productivity improvements is on average
significantly lower in the service production typically provided by the government than in
other sectors.
From a policy perspective the wage dependency of government cash transfers is the
most disputable, and therefore the most interesting, link between productivity growth
and fiscal sustainability. Full wage indexation implies that the relative material living
standards between employed and unemployed individuals are maintained. The additional
income earned by more productive workers are also shared by those who do not take part
in the productivity improvement. Wage indexation of cash transfers are more common
in the Nordic countries with a stronger tradition for equity than in e.g. the US and the
UK, where price indexation of income replacement schemes is more usual. Less generous
indexation seems to be a typical cost saving element in the wave of public pension reforms.
For example, the proposed reform of the Norwegian public pension system includes a less
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generous indexation than the present wage indexation.5
Since the fiscal eﬀects of general equilibrium repercussions are likely to be highly coun-
try specific, relevant CGE models seem to be the appropriate tool for assessing the fiscal
eﬀects of productivity based growth. Probably, model based estimates will also be more
respected by the public than more simple estimates, despite some loss of transparency. In
light of both the possible magnitudes of the general equilibrium eﬀects, and the unpopular
fiscal policy decisions facing ageing economies, such as cost saving public pension reforms,
it seems important to provide such a common understanding of the basic determinants of
the future tax burden.
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Appendix 1: How the consumption tax base de-
pends on productivity
The point of departure is the model with exogenous labour supply in Section 2. The
base of the consumption tax can be written as
CT + PNCN = (P
σ
N + PN)CN . (22)
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By appropriate substitutions into the labour market equilibrium condition, the solution
for CN is:
LT + LN = L− LG ⇔
CT −O
AT
+
CN
AN
= L− LG ⇔
PσNCN
AT
+
CN
AN
= L− LG +
O
AT
⇔
CN =
AT (L− LG) +O
PσN + PN
, (23)
where we have used that the national trade balance constraint, CT = ATLT +O, follows
from adding the two budget constraints yields. (When = AT = AN = 1 initially, CN =
L−LG+O
2 due to symmetric preferences.) Using this expression for CN , the equilibrium
consumption tax base becomes:
CT + PNCN = (P
σ
N + PN )

AT (L− LG) +O
PσN + PN

= AT (L− LG) +O, (24)
which is independent of AN .
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